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I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine, after years of hard work, you decide to invest your money, only to be
defrauded by your financial adviser. This tragedy actually occurred when the Bayou
Hedge Fund (“Bayou”) stole over $300,000,000 from thousands of investors.1 Some
of the investors defrauded did not willingly choose to invest in Bayou.2 Among
them were workers of the Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority who were
indirectly exposed to the fund through their pension plan.3 In addition, others were
defrauded because of their direct investment in Bayou or through their investment in
a fund of a hedge fund (“fund of fund”).4
Bayou was formed in 1996 and after a few months started losing money.5 Rather
than report these losses, the two owners of the fund, Samuel Israel III and Daniel E.
Marino, began a fraudulent scheme.6 Their actions resulted in innocent investors
losing approximately $350,000,0007 and Marino threatening to commit suicide.8 To
conceal this fraud, Israel and Marino issued false and misleading financial
statements, account statements, and performance summary documents to both clients
and potential investors.9 Bayou fabricated its supposedly independent audit10 reports
1

Gretchen Morgenson, A Hedge Fund Falls Off the Face of the Earth, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
28, 2005, at C1.
2
Brett Arends, T Pension $ Mired in Bayou Hedge Fund Scandal, BOSTON HERALD, Sept.
22, 2005, at 30.
3

Id.

4

Gretchen Morgenson, Connect the Dots. Find the Fees., N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4, 2005, § 3, at
1 (“Because Bayou's minimum-investment requirement of $250,000 was smaller than that of
most hedge funds, the firm unfortunately attracted a lot of individual investors.”). Moreover,
numerous investors were exposed to Bayou through their investments in funds of funds which
have minimum investment requirements as low as $25,000. Id.
5
See Complaint at 2, SEC v. Israel III, No. 05-8376 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2005), available at
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/comp19406.pdf.
6
Gretchen Morgenson, What Really Happened at Bayou, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 2005, at
C1. The fraud perpetrated by Bayou started in 1996 and ended in 2005. Id.
7

See Complaint, supra note 5, at 2.

8

Morgenson, supra note 6.

9

See id.
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by creating a fictitious accounting firm known as Richmond-Fairfield Associates.11
It executed its trades through Bayou Securities, a broker-dealer,12 owned by Israel.13
While Bayou Securities earned large profits on trades, the Bayou Hedge Fund
continued to suffer severe losses.14 Attempting to hide money from investors, Israel
and Marino transferred approximately $100,000,000 to European bank accounts.15
When the money was wired from Europe back to the United States it was seized by
the Arizona Attorney General.16 Two months later, Israel and Marino sent a letter to
Bayou’s investors stating that the fund would be liquidated and ninety percent of the
clients’ money would be returned.17 However, redemption checks tendered to clients
were returned for insufficient funds. 18 Therefore, it is likely that the only money
available to investors out of the $450,000,000 invested in Bayou is the $100,000,000
seized by the Arizona Attorney General.19
Bayou is one of nearly eight thousand hedge funds.20 The term “hedge fund” has
no uniformly accepted definition, but generally refers to a private investment vehicle
that invests in numerous assets and employs many different investment strategies.21
Hedge funds differ in three important ways from mutual funds, which are the typical
10

JOHN DOWNES & JORDAN ELLIOT GOODMAN, DICTIONARY OF FINANCE AND INVESTMENT
TERMS 41 (2003) (“[An] audit [is a] professional examination and verification of a company’s
accounting documents and supporting data for the purpose of rendering an opinion as to their
fairness, consistency, and conformity with GENERALLY ACCEPTED ACCOUNTING
PRINCIPLES.”).
11

See Complaint, supra note 5, at 6.

12
DOWNES & GOODMAN, supra note 10, at 160. A broker-dealer is an individual or firm
acting as a principal in a securities transaction. Principals trade for their own account and risk.
Id. When buying from a broker acting as a dealer, a customer receives securities from the
firm’s inventory; and the confirmation must disclose this transaction. Id. Since most
brokerage firms operate as brokers and principals the term broker-dealer is commonly used.
Id.
13

See Complaint, supra note 5, at 5.

14

See id. at 8.

15

See id. at 9.

16

See Morgenson, supra note 6.

17

Id.

18

See id.

19

Id.

20

Amanda Cantrell, Take My Hedge Fund . . . Please: Like a Worn Out Comedian Hedge
Funds are Having a Tough, Sobering 2005 (Oct. 14, 2005), http://money.cnn.com/2005/10/14/
technology/hedgefunds/index.htm. Currently, commentators believe that the assets in hedge
funds are over $1,000,000,000,000. Id.
21

This definition is similar to the one given in almost every government report,
practioner’s guide, and scholarly work reviewed by the author. See, e.g., IMPLICATIONS OF THE
GROWTH OF HEDGE FUNDS: STAFF REPORT TO THE U.S. SEC 3 (2003), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/hedgefunds0903.pdf [hereinafter STAFF REPORT]; DOUGLAS
L. HAMMER ET AL., SHARTSIS FRIESE LLP, U.S. REGULATION OF HEDGE FUNDS 1 (2005); Willa
E. Gibson, Is Hedge Fund Regulation Necessary?, 73 TEMP. L. REV. 681, 683 (2000).
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investment for an average investor.22 First, unlike mutual funds, most hedge funds
charge a twenty percent profit participation fee.23 This means that the hedge fund
manager keeps twenty percent of the profits.24 Second, while most mutual funds do
not use leverage, which is the use of borrowed money to enhance returns, over
seventy percent of hedge funds do use leverage.25 Third, unlike mutual funds, hedge
funds are not diversified.26 Whereas most mutual funds diversify by investing in
many different assets, hedge funds often have their money in only a few securities.27
Because of hedge funds’ lack of diversification, use of leverage, and profit
participation fees, they are inherently more risky than mutual funds.28
Most hedge funds are limited to “qualified clients” and “qualified purchasers” to
escape regulation under the federal securities laws.29 Generally, a “qualified
purchaser” is a natural person who owns at least $5,000,000 in investments.30 By
contrast, a “qualified client” is an investor having either a net worth of $1,500,000 or
having $750,000 invested in the fund.31

22

See INV. CO. INST. & THE SEC. INDUS. ASS’N, EQUITY OWNERSHIP IN AMERICA, 2005 1
(2005), available at http://www.ici.org/pdf/rpt_05_equity_owners.pdf. Mutual funds are the
most common investment of the average investor. See id. at 4. However, this trend may be
changing because of alternative investments such as hedge funds. See id.
23

Mitchell D. Eichen & John M. Longo, The Future of Hedge Funds: Five Emerging
Trends, J. FIN. PLAN. BETWEEN ISSUES E-NEWSL., Dec. 12, 2005, http://www.fpanet.org/
journal/BetweenTheIssues/Contributions/121505.cfm.
24

Id.

25

Inv. Co. Inst., The Differences Between Mutual Funds and Hedge Funds,
http://www.ici.org/funds/abt/faqs_hedge.html (last visited May 20, 2007).
26

Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, Hedge Funds in Corporate Governance and
Corporate Control 36 (U. Pa. L. Sch. Scholarship at Penn Law, Working Paper No. 99, 2006),
available at http://lsr.nellco.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1102&context=upenn/wps.
27

Id.

28

Id.

29

See STAFF REPORT, supra note 21, at 11.

30

15 U.S.C. § 80a-2a(51)(A)(i) (2000). A “qualified purchaser” is not the same as a
“qualified client.” Additionally, it is more financially difficult to be a “qualified purchaser”
than to be a “qualified client.” See STAFF REPORT, supra note 21, at 11. According to the
Commission:
Section 2(a)(51) of the Investment Company Act generally defines “qualified
purchaser” to be: (1) any natural person who owns not less than $5 million in
investments; (2) any family-owned company (as described in that section) that owns
not less than $5 million in investments; (3) any other trust the trustee and settlor(s) of
which are qualified purchasers that was not formed for the specific purpose of
acquiring the securities of the Section 3(c)(7) fund; and (4) any person acting for its
own account or the accounts of other qualified purchasers, that owns and invests on a
discretionary basis not less than $25 million in investments.
STAFF REPORT, supra note 21, at 12.
31
Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, 69 Fed. Reg.
72,054, 72,076 (Dec. 10, 2004) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 275).
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Funds of funds have different investment requirements than hedge funds.32
Funds of funds are entities that invest in two or more traditional hedge funds.33 The
Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC” or “Commission”) only imposes an
investment minimum on funds of funds of $25,000.34 In addition, funds of funds
have much less restrictive investment requirements than traditional hedge funds
because investors only have to meet the “accredited investor” standard.35 An
“accredited investor”36 is an investor having an individual income of $200,000 or

A “qualified client” under rule 205-3 is: (i) A natural person who or a company that
immediately after entering into the contract has at least $ 750,000 under the
management of the investment adviser; (ii) A natural person who or a company that
the investment adviser entering into the contract (and any person acting on his behalf)
reasonably believes, immediately prior to entering into the contract, either: (A) Has a
net worth (together, in the case of a natural person, with assets held jointly with a
spouse) of more than $ 1,500,000 at the time the contract is entered into; or (B) Is a
qualified purchaser as defined in section 2(a)(51)(A) of the Investment Company Act
of 1940 [15 U.S.C. § 80a-2] at the time the contract is entered into; or (iii) A natural
person who immediately prior to entering into the contract is: (A) An executive
officer, director, trustee, general partner, or person serving in a similar capacity, of the
investment adviser; or (B) An employee of the investment adviser (other than an
employee performing solely clerical, secretarial or administrative functions with
regard to the investment adviser) who, in connection with his or her regular functions
or duties, participates in the investment activities of such investment adviser, provided
that such employee has been performing such functions and duties for or on behalf of
the investment adviser, or substantially similar functions or duties for or on behalf of
another company for at least 12 months.
Id.
32
Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, Funds of Hedge Funds: Higher Costs and Risks for Higher
Potential Returns (Aug. 23, 2002), http://www.nasd.com/InvestorInformation/InvestorAlerts/
index.htm (follow “Funds of Hedge Funds - Higher Costs and Risks for Higher Potential
Returns” hyperlink).
33

JOSEPH G. NICHOLAS, HEDGE FUNDS
(2004).

OF

FUNDS INVESTING: AN INVESTOR’S GUIDE 3

34

Elizabeth LeBras, SEC Should Rethink Funds-of-Hedge Funds Sales Restrictions, Says
Eisenberg, COMPLIANCE REP., Nov. 14, 2005, at 1.
35

See id.

36

See STAFF REPORT, supra note 21, at 15.
The term “accredited investors” is defined to include:
Individuals who have a net worth, or joint worth with their spouse, above $1,000,000,
or have income above $200,000 in the last two years (or joint income with their spouse
above $300,000) and a reasonable expectation of reaching the same income level in
the year of investment; or are directors, officers or general partners of the hedge fund
or its general partner; and
Certain institutional investors, including: banks; savings and loan associations;
registered brokers, dealers and investment companies; licensed small business
investment companies; corporations, partnerships, limited liability companies and
business trusts with more than $5,000,000 in assets; and many, if not most, employee
benefit plans and trusts with more than $5,000,000 in assets.
Id. (discussing Rule 501 under the Securities Act). See 15 C.F.R. § 230.501(a)(1)-(6) (2007).
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joint income of $300,000, or having individual or joint net worth of $1,000,000.37
Because of the low investment minimum and the less restrictive standards, funds of
funds are readily available to average investors.38
Although participation in hedge funds and funds of funds was once limited to
wealthy investors, average investors have increasing exposure to these entities.39 An
increasing number of average investors can meet the requirement of being an
“accredited investor” and thus can invest in funds of funds.40 Many individuals can
meet the net worth requirement of over $1,000,000 because of the rise in home
values over the past twenty years.41 In addition, 2,400,000 taxpayers who had an
adjusted gross income of $200,000 or more meet the annual income requirement.42
Increased instances of fraud like the kind perpetrated by Bayou is the one of three
reasons why this industry needs more regulation.43 Secondly, because hedge funds
engage in high risk investments and charge excessive management fees, hedge funds
and funds of funds are unsuitable for the average investor.44 Finally, more regulation
is needed because of the overall risk that hedge funds’ use of leverage poses to the
financial markets.45
To detect and deter fraud, the SEC should require all hedge funds to register with
the Commission, use a risk-based approach rather than a cyclical approach to
auditing funds, and impose guidelines to determine which funds to audit. To prevent
37

Id.

38

See Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, supra note 32.

39

GEORGE P. VAN, HEDGE FUND DEMAND AND CAPACITY 2005-2015, at 10 (2005),
available
at
http://www.blumontcapital.com/downloads/articles/082605_HedgeFund
CommentaryFromVAN.pdf.
40
Curtis Zimmermann, Glauber Eyes Minimum Income Rule for Hedge Fund Sales,
COMPLIANCE REP., Nov. 28, 2005, at 1. Robert Glauber, the president of the National
Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) is advocating that funds of funds adopt minimum
investment requirements. Id.
41

Id.

42

Brian Balkovic, High-Income Tax Returns for 2002, SOI BULL., Spring 2005, at 6,
available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/02hiinco.pdf (last visited May 20, 2007). “[F]or
2002, there were 2,414,128 individual income tax returns reporting AGI of $200,000 or more,
and 2,464,515 returns with expanded income of $200,000 or more. These returns represented
1.856 percent and 1.895 percent, respectively, of all returns for 2002.” Id. at 6.
43

Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, 69 Fed. Reg.
72,054, 72,066 (Dec. 10, 2004) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 275, 279).
44
David F. Swensen, Op-Ed., Invest at Your Own Risk, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 2005, at A21.
David Swensen is Yale’s chief investment officer and manages more than $14,000,000,000 in
endowment assets. Id. The Yale endowment has outperformed all other endowments over the
past decade posting annual returns of 16%. Id.
45
See Nicholas Chany et al., Systemic Risk and Hedge Funds (MIT Sloan School of Mgmt.,
Working Paper No. 4535-05, 2005), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstr
act_id=671443.
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average investors from investing in hedge funds, the SEC should require that
investors in funds of funds meet the definition of a “qualified client” and ought to
raise the minimum investment requirement for funds of funds and traditional hedge
funds to $250,000. To decrease the probability of financial market collapse, the SEC
should limit hedge funds’ ability to use leverage by employing the same restrictions
imposed on mutual funds.
Part II of this Note describes the history and development of hedge funds. Part
III illustrates the current problems facing the hedge fund industry. Part IV discusses
hedge fund regulation prior to the Amended Investment Advisers Act of 1940. Part
V analyzes the amendments to the Investment Advisers Act. Part VI discusses
problems with the Amended Advisers Act. Part VII proposes solutions for more
effective regulation of hedge funds. Part VIII summarizes the Note and advocates
for the proposed solutions. Part IX briefly discusses the case Goldstein v. SEC
which struck down the Amended Advisers Act.
II. HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF HEDGE FUNDS
In 1949, Alfred Winslow Jones established the first hedge fund.46 The fund took
large investment positions in stocks, betting that the stocks would increase in value.47
The fund also used leverage to enhance returns.48 It hedged,49 or limited its risk, by
investing a smaller amount of the fund’s money in investments that would increase
in value if the stocks decreased in value.50 Therefore, if the stock prices did go
down, the fund would make a little money on the smaller investments and thus limit
the losses sustained from the larger investments.51 Jones structured the fund as a
limited partnership and used an incentive fee whereby he kept twenty percent of the
profits.52
Most hedge funds today are set up similar to Jones’ fund in that they charge a
profit participation fee of twenty percent and are structured as limited partnerships.53
The limited partnership structure is used so that the profits of the fund are only taxed
at the individual investor level.54 The fund has several limited partner investors, and
one general partner who is the hedge fund adviser.55 The hedge fund adviser is

46

HedgeCo.net, The Origin of Hedge Funds, http://www.hedgeco.net/hedge-fundinformation.htm (last visited May 20, 2007).
47

Id.

48

Id.

49

DOWNES & GOODMAN, supra note 10, at 304 (“Hedging [is a] strategy used to offset
investment risk. A perfect hedge is one eliminating the possibility of future gain or loss.”).
50

HedgeCo.net, supra note 46.

51

Id.

52

Id.

53

Gibson, supra note 21, at 684.

54

Id. at 683-84. Some hedge funds are structured as limited liability companies which also
allow for pass-through tax treatment. DOUGLAS L. HAMMER ET AL., supra note 21, at 3.
55

See DOUGLAS L. HAMMER ET AL., supra note 21, at 10.
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usually one or two individuals who structure themselves as a limited liability
company or a closely held corporation.56
The hedge fund trading strategy is different from the mutual fund strategy. There
are two main differences in the strategies employed by mutual funds and hedge
funds.57 First, mutual funds are generally buy-and-hold investors in that they buy
securities and keep them for a long duration.58 This passive trading strategy is very
different from the active trading strategy employed by hedge funds.59 Hedge funds
change investments frequently to generate returns from fluctuations in market
prices.60 Because certain movements in asset prices are temporary, hedge funds as
active traders hope to make money and unwind their positions in a short period of
time.61 The second major difference in strategy is mutual funds’ and hedge funds’
level of diversification.62 Because mutual funds are diversified,63 if the market
moves against their investment positions in a few securities, they will not suffer
severe losses. By contrast, a hedge fund used to exploit a particular trend in the
market may have a lot of money invested in only a few securities.64 This lack of
diversification makes hedge funds inherently more risky than mutual funds because,
if the market moves against the position of the hedge fund, then the fund will suffer
substantial losses.
Jones’ success as a hedge fund adviser did not go unnoticed. In 1966, it was
reported that his hedge fund substantially outperformed the top mutual funds.65 As a
result of Jones’s success, between 1966 and 1968, many new hedge funds were
launched.66 Like Jones’ fund, these funds used leverage to increase returns.67
However, unlike Jones, many of these managers did not hedge their risk in an effort

56

Hedge Fund World.com, Forming a Hedge Fund, http://www.hedgefundworld.com/
forming_a_hedge_fund.htm (last visited May 20, 2007).
57

See Kahan & Rock, supra note 26, at 53.

58

See Steven Lumpkin & Hans J. Blommestein, Hedge Funds, Highly Leveraged
Investment Strategies and Financial Markets, FIN. MARKET TRENDS, June 1999, at 27, 30,
available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/45/63/1923224.pdf.
59

Kahan & Rock, supra note 26, at 53.

60

Lumpkin & Blommestein, supra note 58, at 32.

61

Kahan & Rock, supra note 26.

62

Inv. Co. Inst, supra note 25, at 36.

63

Id.

64

Id.

65
William Fung & David Hsieh, A Primer on Hedge Funds, 6 J. EMPIRICAL FIN. 309, 310
(1999).
66

Id.

67

Id. at 311.
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to limit loss.68 Because these managers did not hedge risk, in the 1970’s when the
financial markets took a downturn, these hedge funds suffered severe losses.69
Hedge funds faded back into obscurity until 1986, when an article reported that a
hedge fund had compounded annual returns of forty-three percent during its first six
years of existence.70 This performance increased investors’ interest in hedge funds.71
As a result, in the 1990’s, the number of hedge funds increased dramatically.72 This
growth in the quantity of hedge funds73 was accompanied by an increase in the
number of investment strategies employed by the funds.74 In 1998, the growth of
these funds culminated with the collapse of a large hedge fund named Long-Term
Capital Management.75
This collapse did not deter investors from investing in hedge funds. From 1999
to 2004 the amount invested in hedge funds doubled and is now more than
$1,000,000,000.76 Assets in hedge fund are growing faster than mutual fund assets
and already equal one-fifth of the assets of mutual funds.77 Furthermore, over the
past five years, the number of hedge funds has doubled, and they now number over
8,000.78
While hedge funds have experienced rapid growth, funds of funds have increased
at an even greater pace.79 From 1990 to 2002, the annual growth rate for the assets
invested in funds of funds was forty-eight percent compared to a growth rate of
twenty-six percent for the industry as a whole.80 While hedge funds are a relatively

68

Dave Inglis, A Brief History of Hedge Funds, http://www.hughestrustco.com/articles/a_
%20brief_history_of_hedge_funds.html (last visited May 20, 2007).
69

Id.

70

See Fung & Hsieh, supra note 65. This article was published in Institutional Investor
and reported the returns of Julian Robertson’s Tiger Fund. Id.
71

Id.

72

Id.

73

See id.

74

See Gibson, supra note 21, at 685-86 (“Some hedge funds engage in conservative trading
strategies, while other funds are more aggressive. . . . Trading strategy categories for hedge
funds include: relative value hedge funds, event driven hedge funds, equity hedge funds,
global asset allocator hedge funds, short selling hedge funds, sectoral hedge funds, and
market-neutral hedge funds.”).
75

See PRESIDENT’S WORKING GROUP ON FIN. MARKETS, HEDGE FUNDS, LEVERAGE, AND
LESSONS OF LONG-TERM CAPITAL MANAGEMENT viii (1999), available at
http://treas.gov/press/releases/reports/hedgfund.pdf [hereinafter PRESIDENT'S WORKING
GROUP].
THE

76

See Cantrell, supra note 20.

77

See generally Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, 69
Fed. Reg. 72,054 (Dec. 10, 2004) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 275, 279).
78

Amy Borrus, A Guide to the Hedge-Fund Maze, BUS. WK., Oct. 19, 2005, at 55.

79

See NICHOLAS, supra note 33, at 8.

80

Id.
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new investment vehicle, funds of funds are even newer in that less than ten percent
of those that existed in 2002 were in existence in 1990, and more than seventy-five
percent of the funds in existence in 2002 were started after 1996.81 The assets
invested in funds of funds represent over one-third of the total amount invested in
hedge funds.82
III. PROBLEMS IN THE HEDGE FUND INDUSTRY
Because of the growth of traditional hedge funds and funds of funds, three
problems are now highly visible. One problem is the SEC’s inability to detect or
deter the increased instances of hedge fund fraud. Most of the fraud occurs before
the Commission is able to detect the problem, and therefore, investors are unable to
get their money back. Moreover, perpetrators of fraud are not deterred from
committing this act because of the Commission’s lack of resources to detect the
fraud. Another problem is the unsuitability of traditional hedge funds and funds of
funds to average investors. These funds’ lack of diversification, high management
fees, and use of leverage make them too risky for the average investor. The third
problem is the potential risk hedge funds’ use of leverage poses to the financial
markets. If the market moves against the position of one large hedge fund or several
small funds with similar investment positions, it could cause a collapse of the
financial markets.
A. Inability to Detect and Deter Fraud
The SEC has brought over sixty cases of fraud against hedge fund advisers who
have defrauded investors out of billions of dollars.83 Specifically, in 2005 the
Commission brought cases against three prominent hedge funds.84 Though the SEC
has filed these cases,85 these suits were not brought until after the fraud occurred,
with the result being that many investors will never get their money back.
The Commission’s inability to detect fraud before it occurs and to deter fraud
from occurring is most likely due to the nature in which such fraud is
accomplished.86 Most hedge fund advisers who commit fraud do so by falsifying the
fund’s track record to make their investments appear profitable,87 luring investors to
invest in the fund, and keeping the money in the fund while continuing to charge
profit participation and management fees. For example, in the alleged fraud
81

Id.

82
Paul Oranika, Hedge Funds to Woo New Investors Through Performance Reporting,
(Aug. 18, 2005), http://www.hedgeco.net/news/08/2005/hedge-funds-woo-new-investorsperformance-reporting.html.
83
See generally Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, 69
Fed. Reg. 72,054 (Dec. 10, 2004) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 275, 279).
84
Jenny Anderson, S.E.C. Accuses a Jersey Hedge Fund., N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22, 2005, at
C4. These funds are the Bayou Group, the KL Group, and Wood River LLC. Id.
85

Id.

86

See generally Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, 69
Fed. Reg. 72,054.
87

See Morgenson, supra note 6.
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perpetrated by Wood River LLC (“Wood River”), marketing materials claimed
twenty-five percent returns in the first eight months of 2005. 88 However, Wood
River’s largest asset, its stake in Endwave Corporation, had actually declined
seventy-six percent in the final three months of this reporting period.89 As with most
fraud cases, by the time investors tried to get their money back, the firm stopped
answering its phone, locked its doors, and the hedge fund adviser vanished.90
Unfortunately, investors may never recoup the $250,000,000 invested in the fund.91
Similarly, investors will probably not get back over $300,000,000 invested in
Bayou.92 In addition to having false financial statements and continuing to charge
fees, Bayou and Wood River have two other important common characteristics.93
The two funds are similar in that they both had problems associated with their
auditors and broker-dealers.94 Bayou’s auditor was a fake accounting firm created to
produce false audits of Bayou.95 The broker-dealer was Bayou Securities, a dealer
affiliated with the fund through which trades were made to create fraudulent
commissions.96 With respect to Wood River, their marketing literature listed a
former American Express unit as their outside auditor, but that company did not
audit the fund.97 Furthermore, Wood River claimed that Morgan Stanley was one of
its two prime brokers, but this firm never executed its trades.98
B. Unsuitable for Average Investors
While hedge fund fraud affects all investors, hedge funds pose problems that are
unique to average investors. These three problems are hedge funds’ lack of
diversification, use of leverage, and high management fees. First, hedge funds are
often not diversified99 and thus a move in the market against funds’ investments can
result in negative returns occurring very quickly and in substantial quantities.
Second, because many of these losses are incurred while employing leverage, 100 a
large movement against the investment position can result in much greater losses

88
Justin Hibbard & Adrienne Carter, Another Fishy Hedge Fund: A Mysterious Money
Manager, Nonstop Hype, Plunging Returns, Empty Offices, and Now an SEC Probe—the
Intrigue at Wood River Deepens, BUS. WK., Oct. 24, 2005, at 36-40.
89

Id.

90

Id.

91

Id.

92

See Morgenson, supra note 6.

93

Hibbard & Carter, supra note 88, at 36.

94

Morgenson, supra note 6.

95

Id.

96

Id.

97

Hibbard & Carter, supra note 88, at 38.

98

Id.

99

See generally Kahan & Rock, supra note 26, at 36.

100

See generally Inv. Co. Inst, supra note 25.
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than in mutual funds. Third, hedge funds’ twenty percent profit participation fee101
means that they must generate a return that is twenty percent greater than the return
generated by a mutual fund to make the same profit for an investor. While wealthy
investors may be able to absorb losses in a hedge fund because they have a well
diversified portfolio,102 average investors could lose their entire life savings if they
invest solely in a hedge fund. Furthermore, unlike wealthy investors, average
investors typically have investments in a few assets103 and the potential large losses
of hedge funds could thus seriously impact their financial status.
In addition, the fees to invest in funds of funds are even higher than the fees
associated with hedge funds.104 This is because funds of funds charge two layers of
fees.105 The fees include the fees charged by the fund of fund and those charged by
the underlying hedge funds.106 For example, the fees charged by a fund of fund
usually include a management fee of one and a half percent, which is paid directly to
the manager of the fund.107 The charges also indirectly include the profit participation
fees and the management fees charged by underlying hedge funds because the fund
of fund has to pay these fees to invest in hedge funds.108 Additionally, funds of funds
are as risky as hedge funds because they invest solely in hedge funds.109 Because
funds of funds have large fees and are high risk investments, they are unsuitable for
average investors.110
Finally, there has been an increase in the number of investors eligible to invest in
funds of funds. An investor must be an accredited investor to invest in funds of
funds. An “accredited investor” is an investor having an individual income of
$200,000 or joint income of $300,000, or having individual or joint net worth of
$1,000,000.111 The number of investors who meet the “accredited investor112”
standard has significantly increased since the definition was drafted in 1982.113 The
101

Eichen & Longo, supra note 23.

102

Amanda Cantrell, Hedge Funds for the Rest of Us: There’s a Slew of Mutual Funds
Aiming to Bring Hedging Tactics to Average Investors (July 3, 2006),
http://money.cnn.com/2006/06/30/markets/hedge_mutual/index.htm.
103

William N. Goetzmann & Alok Kumar, Diversification Decisions of Individual
Investors and Asset Prices 3 (Yale Int’l Ctr. for Fin., Working Paper No. 03-31, 2003),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=469441.
104

See NICHOLAS, supra note 33, at 55.

105

Id.

106

See id.

107

See id.

108

See generally Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, 69
Fed. Reg. 72,054 (Dec. 10, 2004) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 275, 279).
109

Id.

110

Id.

111

17 C.F.R. § 230.215(e)-(f) (2003).

112

Id.

113

See Zimmermann, supra note 40, at 1.
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problem with using the current standard of “accredited investor” is that it has not
been amended since it was adopted.114 Consequently, millions of investors now meet
the $1,000,000 net worth requirement necessary to invest in funds of funds.115 One
reason that investors who did not meet the definition of an “accredited investor”
when it was drafted but who now do enjoy this status is the increase in home values
over the last twenty years, which has caused an increase in these investors’ net
worth.116 In addition, 2,400,000 taxpayers had an adjusted gross income of $200,000
or more in 2002 and thus were eligible to invest in funds of funds.117
C. Hedge Funds Use of Leverage and Risk to Financial Markets
Hedge funds’ problematic use of leverage is exemplified by the near collapse of
the hedge fund Long-Term Capital Management. In addition, hedge funds cause a
serious risk to financial markets through systemic risk.
First, the possibility that hedge funds could cause a financial crisis affects both
investors and non-investors. In 1998, the near collapse of the hedge fund Long-Term
Capital Management proved that the potential for such a crisis is not mere theory.118
Long-Term Capital Management started in 1994 and by 1997 the amount invested in
the fund increased substantially.119 At the end of 1997, even after returning over
$2,500,000,000 to investors, there was still nearly $5,000,000,000 in the fund.120
Despite reducing the amount of money invested in the fund, Long-Term Capital
Management did not reduce its investment positions and continued to use leverage to
maintain its current investment levels.121
With respect to leverage, in August of 1998, the fund had $125,000,000,000 of
investments financed with less than $5,000,000,000 of actual money.122 This means

114
Id. The SEC, when given the opportunity to address the definition of an “accredited
investor” declined to change the requirements. See STAFF REPORT, supra note 21, at 5.
115

See Zimmermann, supra note 40, at 1.

116

Id.

117

See supra text accompanying note 42.

118

See PRESIDENT’S WORKING GROUP, supra note 75, at A-2. The SEC staff, in
summarizing the information contained in this report, concluded that:
The report examined hedge funds in general as well as LTCM, analyzed the public
policy issues presented to the markets by leverage, risk and bankruptcy, and
recommended a number of measures designed to constrain excessive leverage in the
financial system.
The report focused on the risk management and transparency issues raised by
LTCM as well as “highly leveraged institutions” in general. It also focused on the
exposure of banks and others to the counterparty risks of highly leveraged entities such
as hedge funds.
STAFF REPORT, supra note 21, app. A, at 3.
119

See PRESIDENT’S WORKING GROUP, supra note 75, at 11.

120

Id.

121

Id.

122

Id. at 12.
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the fund had a leverage ratio,123 which is the amount of debt compared to the amount
of assets, of more than twenty-five to one.124 The fund’s leverage made it vulnerable
to market conditions which are highly unpredictable and always changing.125 In
August of 1998, following Russia’s devaluation126 of its currency, the ruble, LongTerm Capital Management’s assets went from slightly over $4,000,000,000 to less
than $2,000,000,000 bringing its losses for the year to over fifty percent.127
To stave off the potential impact of the collapse to other financial institutions, the
Federal Reserve Bank of New York persuaded fourteen commercial lenders to inject
over $3,500,000,000 into the fund.128 This capital infusion prevented a potential
collapse of the fund, a collapse which would have negatively impacted the world
financial markets.129 Had Long-Term Capital Management not been able to meet its
debts, the financial institutions who originally loaned money to the fund may not
have been able to meet the debts they owed to other creditors.130 If this occurred, a
domino effect would have resulted whereby financial institutions defaulted on their
loans.131 Such defaults could cause chaos to the financial system.132
Second, hedge funds’ use of leverage contributes to systemic risk. Systemic risk
is commonly used to describe the possibility of a series of defaults on loans by
financial institutions in a short period of time caused by a single major event.133 It
occurs when one participant in a financial market who is unable to pay its debt
causes others who need to pay their debt to be unable to meet their obligations when
due.134 Because the financial markets are interdependent, a sudden default by one
large borrower or several small borrowers because of one major event can cause the
financial markets to collapse.135

123

DOWNES & GOODMAN, supra note 10, at 378-79. The leverage ratio is often referred to
as the debt-to-equity ratio because it reflects the amount of debt compared to the amount of
shareholder’s equity on a financial balance sheet. Id. A firm with $3,000,000 in investments
and $1,000,000 in debt would have a leverage or debt-to-equity ratio of thirty-three percent.
124

See PRESIDENT’S WORKING GROUP, supra note 75, at B-13.

125

Id.

126

DOWNES & GOODMAN, supra note 10, at 175 (“Devaluation [is the] lowering of the
value of a country’s currency relative to gold and/or the currencies of other nations.
Devaluation can also result from a rise in value of other currencies relative to the currency of a
particular country.”).
127

See PRESIDENT’S WORKING GROUP, supra note 75, at 13.

128

Id. at 13-14.

129

Id.

130

Id.

131

Id.

132

Id.

133

Chan, supra note 45, at 1.

134

Id.

135

Id.
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In September of 2005, the same fourteen commercial lenders who had visited the
Federal Reserve during the Long-term Capital Management crisis returned to discuss
hedge fund practices.136 The Federal Reserve’s invitation was issued in response to
several reports by regulators, academics, and market participants expressing
concerns about the increase of systemic risk caused by the investment positions of
hedge funds. 137 Because the market events that cause systemic risk are highly
unpredictable, the most effective way to prevent them from occurring is limiting
large institutions’ use of leverage.138
IV. REGULATION PRIOR TO THE AMENDED INVESTMENT ADVISERS ACT
Historically, hedge funds went largely unregulated because they qualified for a
variety of exceptions which exempted them from regulation under the Securities Act
of 1933, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the Investment Company Act of 1940,
and the Investment Advisers Act of 1940.139 Even after adoption of the Amended
Investment Advisers Act, hedge funds may still be subject to these regulations.140
A. Securities Act of 1933
Section 5 of the Securities Act of 1933 mandates that issuers of securities register
with the Commission and comply with the various provisions of the Act.141
Therefore, hedge funds that issue securities must register with the SEC unless they
qualify for an exemption.142 One such exemption is section 4(2) of the Act, which
exempts from registration issuers of securities that do not make a public offering.143
Hedge funds take advantage of this requirement by only offering investment in their
funds to private investors.144 These private investors include both “institutional
investors,”145 which are organizations that invest in large volumes of securities, and
136
Tim Reason, Who's Holding the Bag? Everyone Knows Banks are Shedding More Risk
These Days So Where Does it Go?, CFO MAG., Oct. 27, 2005, at 40.
137

See Chan, supra note 45, at 1.

138

Id.

139

See Gibson, supra note 21, at 688.

140

Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, 69 Fed. Reg.
72,054, 72,056 (Dec. 10, 2004) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 275, 279).
141

See STAFF REPORT, supra note 21, at 13.

142

Id. at 13.

143
15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (2000). The provisions of section 5 do not apply to transactions by
an issuer not involving any public offering. Id.
144

See Gibson, supra note 21, at 689.

145

DOWNES & GOODMAN, supra note 10, at 335-36.
[An] institutional investor [is an] organization that trades large volumes of securities.
Some examples are mutual funds, banks, insurance companies, pension funds, labor
union funds, corporate profit-sharing plans, and college endowment funds. Typically,
upwards of 70% of the daily trading on the New York Stock Exchange is on behalf of
institutional investors.
Id.
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individual investors with high net worth.146 Hedge funds can also claim the section
4(2) exemption by meeting the requirements of Rule 506 of Regulation D, which
governs private offerings.147 While Rule 506 is not the exclusive means for
establishing the exemption, the rule is often described as a “safe harbor” provision
because satisfaction of the provision establishes entitlement to the exemption.148
B. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934
Hedge funds can be subject to regulation under the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 in two ways.149 First, this Act requires that broker-dealers register with the
Commission, and such registration mandates that they comply with its
requirements.150 Hedge funds typically do not meet the definition of a broker-dealer
but are instead classified as traders and are thus exempted under this portion of the
Act.151 The second part of the Act requires traders holding certain securities positions
to register with the Commission.152 Section 12g and Rule 12g-1 require that a trader
of securities with 500 investors and assets in excess of $10,000,000 register with the
Commission.153 Hedge funds exempt themselves from this requirement by limiting
their funds to 499 investors.154
C. The Investment Company Act of 1940
The Investment Company Act of 1940 requires investment companies,
companies that invest the pooled funds of small investors, to register with the SEC
and comply with the provisions of the Act. 155 Nearly all hedge funds come within
the definition of an investment company.156 However, hedge funds escape
146

See Gibson, supra note 21, at 689.

147

See STAFF REPORT, supra note 21, at 14.

148

See Gibson, supra note 21, at 689.

149

Id. at 691.

150

Id. at 691-92.

151
See STAFF REPORT, supra note 21, at 18 (“The Commission historically has
distinguished ‘dealers’ from ‘traders.’ A trader is a person that buys and sells securities, either
individually or in a trustee capacity, but not as part of a regular business. Entities that buy and
sell securities for investment generally are considered traders, but not dealers.”).
152

See Joseph Hellrung, Note & Comment, Hedge Fund Regulation: Investors are
Knocking at the Door, but can the SEC Clean House Before Everyone Rushes In?, 9 N.C.
BANKING INST. 317, 325 (2005).
153

See STAFF REPORT, supra note 21, at 18.

154

See Hellrung, supra note 152, at 325.

155

See DOWNES & GOODMAN, supra note 10, at 351 (“[An] investment company [is a] firm
that, for a management fee, invests the pooled funds of small investors in securities
appropriate for its stated investment objectives. It offers participants more diversification,
liquidity, and professional management service than would normally be available to them as
individuals.”).
156

STAFF REPORT, supra note 21, at 11 n.32.
Section 3(a)(1)(A) of the Investment Company Act defines an investment company as
an issuer which is or holds itself out as being engaged primarily, or proposes to engage
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registering by relying on one of two exclusions from the definition of an investment
company.157
The first exclusion is under section 3(c)(1) of the Investment Company Act,
which exempts from the definition of an investment company any issuer of securities
with not more than 100 investors and which does not make a public offering.158 A
limited partnership or corporation that invests in a hedge fund is treated as one
investor for the purposes of the 100 investor limitation.159 Hedge funds take
advantage of this exemption by limiting their funds to less than 100 private
investors.160
The second exclusion is under section 3(c)(7) of the Investment Company Act,
which exempts from registration investment companies whose investments are
owned only by “qualified purchasers” and which do not make or propose to make a
public offering.161 Generally, a “qualified purchaser” is a natural person who owns at
least $5,000,000 in investments.162 While this exemption is not limited to a certain
number of investors, a fund using this exclusion typically limits the number of
investors to less than 500 to escape regulation under the Securities Act of 1934.163
D. The Investment Advisers Act of 1940
The Investment Advisers Act of 1940 requires an investment adviser with more
than fifteen clients and over $30,000,000 in assets to register with the Commission
and comply with its regulations.164 Nearly all hedge fund advisers meet the
definition of an investment adviser.165 They satisfy the requirements because they

primarily, in the business of investing, reinvesting or trading in securities. Section
3(a)(1)(C) of that Act defines an investment company as an issuer that is engaged or
proposes to engage in the business of investing, reinvesting, owning, holding or
trading in securities, and owns or proposes to acquire investment securities having a
value exceeding 40 percent of the value of its total assets (exclusive of government
securities and cash items) on an unconsolidated basis. Many hedge funds meet both of
these definitions.
Id.
157

See Gibson, supra note 21, at 694.

158

15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(1) (2000).

159

See Gibson, supra note 21, at 698.

160

Id.

161

Id. at 695.

162

See STAFF REPORT, supra note 21, at 11.

163

See Gibson, supra note 21, at 696.

164

See Hellrung, supra note 152, at 326.
Advisors with less than twenty five million in assets are not permitted to register with
the SEC. Advisors with between twenty five and thirty million dollars under
management are advised, but not required, to register with the SEC. Advisors with at
least thirty million of assets under management are required to register with the SEC.”
Id. at 345 n.94 (citations omitted).
165

See STAFF REPORT, supra note 21, at 20.
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counsel clients regarding investment opportunities.166 However, most hedge fund
advisers escape regulation because they qualify for an exemption under section
203(b) of this Act.167 This exemption is often referred to as the “private adviser
exemption” because it exempts from registration investment advisers who have had
less than fifteen clients during the preceding twelve months, who do not hold
themselves out to the public as an investment adviser, and who are not advisers to a
registered investment company.168
Prior to the amendment of the Investment Advisers Act, section 203(b) allowed
advisers to count each “legal organization”169 as a single client.170 This meant that a
hedge fund structured as a limited partnership, with numerous limited partner
investors and one general partner, was treated as a single client for purposes of the
Act.171 Therefore, a hedge fund adviser could manage up to fourteen hedge funds
and, by using this type of organizational structure, escape regulation.172 So long as
the adviser managed less than fifteen funds, did not make a public offering of these
funds, and such funds were not registered investment companies, the hedge fund
adviser did not have to register with the Commission.173
In sum, hedge funds have organized themselves to be exempt from registering
and complying with federal securities laws. Those funds that do not qualify for
exemptions are subject to regulation under the Securities Act of 1933, the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, the Investment Company Act of 1940, and the Investment
Advisers Act of 1940. The Amended Investment Advisers Act requires more hedge
funds to register with the Commission and comply with its requirements.
V. THE AMENDMENTS TO THE INVESTMENT ADVISERS ACT
In December of 2004, the SEC amended the Investment Advisers Act, closing the
203(b) exemption in an attempt to require hedge fund advisers to register with the
Commission.174 The Act also sets forth requirements that hedge funds must meet to
charge profit participation fees.175 Additionally, it mandates that funds of funds
166
Recent Development in Hedge Funds: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous.
& Urban Affairs, 108th Cong. 35 (2003) (prepared statement of William H. Donaldson,
Chairman,
U.S.
SEC),
available
at
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgibin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=108_senate_hearings&docid=f:92703.pdf (“Managers of hedge funds
meet the definition of ‘investment adviser’ under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940
because they are in the business of providing investment advice about securities to others.”).
167

See STAFF REPORT, supra note 21, at 20.

168

15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(b)(3) (2000).

169

See Gibson, supra note 21, at 698.

170

Id.

171

Id.

172

Id.

173

Id.

174

Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, 69 Fed. Reg.
72,054, 72,056 (Dec. 10, 2004) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 275, 279).
175

Id. at 72,071.
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register with the Commission.176 Finally, registration under the Act subjects hedge
funds and funds of funds to various compliance requirements.177
A. Hedge Funds Must Register with the Commission
The Amended Advisers Act requires that all “private funds” register with the
Commission.178 In section 203(b)(3)-1, the SEC defines a “private fund” to reflect
three common characteristics of hedge funds.179 A private fund is a firm that would
be an investment company under section 3(a) of the Investment Company Act of
1940 but for the exception provided from that definition by either section 3(c)(1) or
section 3(c)(7) of the Act;180 that permits its owners to redeem any portion of their
ownership interests within two years of the purchase of such interests;181 and whose
interests are or have been offered based on the investment advisory skills, ability, or
expertise of the investment adviser.182
Provided that a hedge fund meets the requirements of a “private fund,” section
203(b)(3)-2 requires advisers of “private funds” to count each client for purposes of
determining the availability of the 203(b) “private adviser exemption.”183 If the
hedge fund adviser advises more than fourteen clients, the adviser must register with
the Commission.184 However, an adviser may no longer count each legal
organization as a single client.185 The Act redefines the term client to include the
shareholders, limited partners, members, or beneficiaries of a “private fund.”186
Thus, advisers to private funds have to “look through” each fund under management

176

Id. at 72,076.

177

Id. at 72,071.

178

Id. at 72,069.

179

Id. at 72,073 (“We proposed to define a ‘private fund’ by reference to three
characteristics shared by virtually all hedge funds, and that differentiate hedge funds from
other pooled investment vehicles such as private equity funds or venture capital funds.”
(footnote omitted)).
180

Id.

181

Id. at 72,074.
Hedge funds typically offer their investors liquidity access following an initial “lockup” period, which is typically for less than two years. Thus, this provision will
include most hedge fund advisers, but will exclude advisers that manage only private
equity funds, venture capital funds, and similar funds that require investors to make
long-term commitments of capital.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
182
Id. at 72,068. Other securities laws, such as rule 205-3(b) also require that investors
meet the “qualified investor” criteria if the investment company adviser charges a performance
fee. Id.
183

Id. at 72,070.

184

Id.

185

Id.

186

Id.
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and count each limited partner investor or shareholder as only one client.187 The
result of this “look through” provision is that hedge fund advisers who manage
“private funds” with more than $30,000,000 in assets and fifteen individual investors
must register with the Commission.188 Before the Amended Act, most of these funds
escaped regulation, but now all of them must register and are, thus, subject to certain
compliance requirements.189
B. Requirements for Charging Profit Participation Fees
For hedge funds to charge their customary profit participation fees, they must
limit the availability of their funds to “qualified clients” or “qualified purchasers.”190
A qualified purchaser is a natural person who owns at least $5,000,000 in
investments.191 A “qualified client” is an investor having either a net worth of
$1,500,000 or having $750,000 invested in the fund.192 Prior to amendment of the
Act, some hedge funds only required individuals to be “accredited investors,” a
standard which has less stringent financial requirements.193 An “accredited
investor”194 is an investor having an individual income of $200,000 or joint income
of $300,000, or having individual or joint net worth of $1,000,000.195 While some
advisers required their clients to be “accredited investors,” others allowed individuals
to invest in the fund by meeting lower investment requirements.196 The Amended
Act grandfathers in those investors who are neither “qualified purchasers” nor
“qualified investors” by allowing the fund to continue to charge them profit
participation fees.197 However, all new participants must be “qualified purchasers”
or “qualified clients.”198
To continue to charge profit participation fees, funds relying on the 3(c)(1)
exemption must limit their funds to “qualified clients,” while funds relying on the
3(c)(7) exemption must limit their funds to “qualified purchasers.”199 Therefore,
investors in 3(c)(1) funds will likely have either a net worth of $1,500,000 or have
187

Id. at 72,071.

188

Id.

189

Id. 72,071.

190

Id.

191

See supra note 30.

192
See generally Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, 69
Fed. Reg. 72,054 (Dec. 10, 2004) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 275, 279).
193

Id.

194

See supra note 36.

195

Id.

196
Nancy R. Mandell, Hedge Funds Beware: Ready or Not, Here Comes Regulation, SEC.
WK., Sept. 19, 2005, at 1.
197

See generally Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, 69
Fed. Reg. 72,054.
198

Id. at 72,073.

199

Id. at 72,076.
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$750,000 invested in the fund.200 By contrast, investors in 3(c)(7) funds will have
$5,000,000 of assets.201 Because hedge funds will continue to charge performance
fees, they will only make their funds available to “qualified clients” and “qualified
purchasers.”202
C. Funds of Funds Must Register with the Commission
Just as an adviser to a hedge fund that is a “private fund” must register with the
SEC, an adviser to a fund of fund (which falls under the definition of a “private
fund”) must register with the Commission.203 Before the enactment of the Amended
Advisers Act, most funds of funds escaped regulation by exempting themselves from
the federal securities laws.204 Now, in addition to requiring funds of funds that meet
the definition of a “private fund” to register with the Commission, the Act also
includes a section that requires registration for funds of funds that do not meet the
definition of a “private fund.”205 Section 203(b)(3)-2(b) prescribes a special rule for
a fund of fund, which is a registered investment company under the Investment
Company Act that does not qualify for the 3(c)(1) or 3(c)(7) exemption.206 This
section requires an adviser of a fund of fund to “look through” the fund and count
each investor as a client for purposes of the 203(b) “private adviser exemption.”207
Therefore, even if a fund of fund does not fall under the definition of a “private
fund,” an adviser of a fund of fund with more than $30,000,000 in assets and at least
fifteen clients must register with the Commission.208
While advisers to funds of funds must register with the Commission, because
such funds do not charge profit participation fees, they may allow investors who are
neither “qualified purchasers” nor “qualified clients” to invest in the fund.209
Additionally, funds of funds typically only sell their funds to “accredited

200

See STAFF REPORT, supra note 29, at 11.

201

See supra note 30.

202

Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, 69 Fed. Reg. at
72,056.
203

Id. at 72,071.

204

Id.

205

Id.

206
Id. at 72,077. Because this type of “fund of a hedge fund” is a registered investment
company to which the 3(c)(1) and 3(c)(7) exceptions do not apply, it is not a private fund and
the adviser is not subject to regulation under the Amended Advisers Act absent another section
requiring the adviser to register. Id.
207

Id. at 72,071 (“Without the look-through requirement, an adviser could provide its
services through fourteen or fewer top tier funds and continue to indirectly manage the assets
of hundreds or, in the case of registered funds of hedge funds, thousands of investors, without
registering or being subject to the Commission's oversight.”).
208

See Hellrung, supra note 152, at 326.

209

Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, 69 Fed. Reg.
72,054, 72,071 (Dec. 10, 2004) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 275, 279).
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investors,”210 and the new rules mimic current practice by requiring that these funds
only be sold to “accredited investors.” One way someone qualifies as an “accredited
investor” is to have an individual income of $200,000 or joint income of $300,000.211
The other way is to have individual or joint net worth of $1,000,000.212 In addition
to the requirement that individuals be “accredited investors,” the new rules also
mimic current practice213 by requiring funds of funds to impose a minimum
investment requirement of $25,000. In addition to investment requirements, all
funds of funds and hedge funds that do register with the Commission are subject to
compliance requirements.
D. Compliance Requirements
Registered advisers of hedge funds and funds of funds will have to comply with
the rules of the Investment Advisers Act.214 Compliance with the Act mandates that
hedge fund advisers meet five major requirements.215 These requirements are: (1)
filing an adviser registration form, (2) keeping records, (3) providing a brochure, (4)
developing compliance procedures, and (5) designating a chief compliance officer.216
In addition, it subjects these advisers to random audits conducted by SEC
examiners.217
The first requirement is that hedge fund advisers file an investment adviser
registration form (“Form ADV”) with the Commission and identify themselves as
hedge fund advisers.218 Secondly, hedge fund advisers must keep books and records

210

See STAFF REPORT, supra note 21, at 5.

211

Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, 69 Fed. Reg. at
72,071.
212

Id.

213

See STAFF REPORT, supra note 21, at 5.

214

Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, 69 Fed. Reg. at
72,071.
215
See PRESIDENT’S WORKING GROUP, supra note 75, app. B, at B-15-16. Advisers are also
subject to less costly requirements imposed by the Investment Advisers Act. Id. For example,
registered advisers “cannot assign their advisory contracts without client consent, cannot
engage in principal transactions with their clients without prior client consent, must take steps
to protect client assets that are in their custody, and are limited in the types of performance
fees they can charge.” Id. (footnotes omitted).
216

See Hellrung, supra note 152, at 339.

217

Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, 69 Fed. Reg. at
72,071.
218
Id. at 72,077. “[A]dvisers’ responses to Form ADV are made available to the investing
public on the Internet through the Investment Adviser Public Disclosure system.” Id. at
72,077 n.271. Thus, investors will have access to information about their advisers. Id.
Furthermore, Form ADV will provide the Commission with information about the adviser
because these forms are quite detailed. Id. at 72,083.
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in accordance with rule 204-2.219 The third requirement is that hedge fund advisers
must provide a brochure to prospective and existing clients disclosing business
practices and the background of the adviser.220 Fourth, hedge fund advisers must
develop comprehensive compliance procedures.221 These procedures include ethics
practices for advisory personnel,222 controls to protect clients’ assets,223 solicitations
procedures for sales personnel,224 policies designed to insure advisers vote in the best
interests of clients,225 and procedures designed to prevent violation of the Investment

219

Id. at 72,085. Two requirements are particularly important. Id. at 72,076. The first
important requirement is that advisers advertising their past track record of performance must
keep:
All accounts, books, internal working papers, and any other records or documents that
are necessary to form the basis for or demonstrate the calculation of the performance
or rate of return of any or all managed accounts or securities recommendations in any
notice, circular, advertisement, newspaper article, investment letter, bulletin or other
communication that the investment adviser circulates or distributes, directly or
indirectly, to 10 or more persons (other than persons connected with such investment
adviser); provided, however, that, with respect to the performance of managed
accounts, the retention of all account statements, if they reflect all debits, credits, and
other transactions in a client's account for the period of the statement, and all
worksheets necessary to demonstrate the calculation of the performance or rate of
return of all managed accounts shall be deemed to satisfy the requirements of this
paragraph.
17 C.F.R. § 275.204-2(a)(16) (2003). Such information is vital because many of the hedge
funds charged with fraud have used false marketing materials to persuade new investors to put
money into the fund and to keep current investor’s money in the fund. See Registration Under
the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, 69 Fed. Reg. 72,054. The second
important requirement is that the vast amount of records the adviser must keep under Section
204-2 have to be maintained for five years. 17 C.F.R. § 275.204-2(e)(3) (2003).
220
Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, 69 Fed. Reg. at
72,085 (“Rule 206(4)-4 requires registered investment advisers to disclose to clients and
prospective clients certain disciplinary history or a financial condition that is reasonably likely
to affect contractual commitments.”).
221

See Hellrung, supra note 152, at 339.

222

Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, 69 Fed. Reg. at
72,084 (“Rule 204A-1 requires SEC-registered investment advisers to adopt codes of ethics
setting forth standards of conduct expected of their advisory personnel and addressing
conflicts that arise from personal securities trading by their personnel, and requiring advisers’
‘access persons’ to report their personal securities transactions.”).
223

Id. (“Rule 206(4)-2 requires advisers with custody of their clients' funds and securities
to maintain controls designed to protect those assets from being lost, misused,
misappropriated, or subjected to financial reverses of the adviser.”).
224
Id. at 72,085 (“Rule 206(4)-3 requires advisers who pay cash fees to persons who solicit
clients for the adviser to observe certain procedures in connection with solicitation activity.”).
225

Id. (“Rule 206(4)-6 requires an investment adviser that votes client securities to adopt
written policies reasonably designed to ensure that the adviser votes in the best interests of
clients, and requires the adviser to disclose to clients information about those policies and
procedures.”).
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Advisers Act.226 Lastly, advisers must designate a chief compliance officer.227 In
addition, registration under the Act empowers the SEC to randomly audit hedge fund
advisers at any time to assure that they are complying with these procedures.228
VI. PROBLEMS WITH THE AMENDED ADVISERS ACT
While the Amended Advisers Act is a step in the right direction, it will not
adequately regulate hedge funds. There are five reasons why this Act is ineffective.
These reasons are: (1) the various loopholes in the Act, (2) the SEC’s inability to
conduct random audits, (3) the ineffectiveness of random audits in preventing fraud,
(4) the failure of the rule to limit hedge funds’ use of leverage, and (5) the failure of
the rule to limit retailization of funds of funds.
A. Various Loopholes in the Rule
The first reason the rule is ineffective is because some funds will escape
regulation due to three loopholes in the rule. 229 The first loophole is that a hedge
fund can avoid registration by extending its lock-up period to two years.230 This
means that funds can avoid regulation by disallowing investors from withdrawing
money from the fund for twenty-four months.231 In doing so, it escapes the definition
of a “private fund” and thus does not have to register with the Commission.232

226

Id. (“Rule 206(4)-7 requires each registered investment adviser to adopt and implement
written policies and procedures reasonably designed to prevent violations of the Advisers
Act.”).
227

Id. at 72,085 (“Rule 206(4)-7 requires each registered investment adviser to . . .
designate an individual to serve as chief compliance officer.”). See also 17 C.F.R. §
275.206(4)-7 (2003).
228
15 U.S.C. § 80b-4 (2000) (“All records . . . of such investment advisers are subject at
any time, or from time to time, to such reasonable periodic, special, or other examinations by
representatives of the Commission as the Commission deems necessary or appropriate in the
public interest or for the protection of investors.”).
229
Chidem Kurdas, Use of Registration Loophole Seen as Risky, HEDGEWORLD DAILY
NEWS, Nov. 17, 2005, at 1; Jeff Benjamin, Hedge Funds Exploit a Loophole: Some Funds
Extend Lockup to Avoid Regulatory Oversight, INVESTMENTNEWS, Sept. 26, 2005, (News), at
1. Thomas Kostigen, New Rules Won’t Add Much Oversight on Hedge Funds,
MARKETWATCH, Nov. 15, 2005, http://www.marketwatch.com/News/Story/Story.aspx?guid=
{C0E86627-7ABA-4657-A1AE-E956C17B6FDF}&siteid=tradehaven.
230

See Benjamin, supra note 229.

231

Id.

232

Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, 69 Fed. Reg.
72,054, 72,096 (Dec. 10, 2004) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 275, 279) (Glassman,
Comm’r, & Atkins, Comm’r, dissenting).
[T]his criterion [the two year lock-up period for private funds] will encourage advisers
to extend their redemption periods beyond two years in order to avoid registration.
Therefore, it will be more difficult for investors, once they have made the decision to
invest in a hedge fund, to “vote” on the quality and integrity of the hedge fund
manager by leaving the fund.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
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Moreover, giving hedge funds an incentive to extend lock-ups may be
counterproductive because hedge funds prefer longer access to capital and now have
justification for requiring investors to leave their money in the fund for a greater
duration.233 This lock-up period could also adversely affect investors because they
cannot withdraw their money from the fund even if the fund is experiencing severe
losses.234
The second loophole is that some hedge funds have interpreted the Act to apply
only to new investments.235 This interpretation is based on the requirement that a
“private fund” must have a lock-up period of less than two years.236 Because only
new investments are subject to this requirement, some hedge fund advisers believe
that, for their fund to be defined as a “private fund,” it must accept new money.237
Accordingly, some funds are choosing not to register with the Commission by either
not accepting new money or by accepting new money subject to a two-year lock-up
period.238 While there is not a specific grandfather provision,239 some hedge funds
are capitalizing on this interpretation of the rule to avoid SEC registration.240
The third loophole is that funds with less than $25,000,000 in assets do not have
to register with the Commission.241 The SEC exempts these funds from registration242
because of its lack of resources to conduct random audits. However, according to
the Commission, twenty of the forty-six cases brought at the time this amendment
was proposed were committed by funds too small to register under the Amended
Act.243 Therefore, exempting funds with $25,000,000 or less in assets ignores nearly
Furthermore, the Commissioners had parted ways just sixteen times during former
Chairman William Donaldson’s tenure as director of the SEC. Carrie Johnson, Independent
Chairmen Required for Funds: SEC Aims to Eliminate Conflicts of Interest, WASH. POST, June
24, 2004, at E4. Such disagreement only occurred in one percent of the 1,606 votes the
agency conducted during this period. Id.
233

See Kostigen, supra note 229, at 1.

234

Id.

235
236

See Kurdas, supra note 229.
Id.

237

Id. (“By the logic of the rule as written, there has been an inference that such managers
[managers who do not take new money] would . . . be exempt.”).
238

Id.

239

Id. (“When the registration rule was being prepared, there was discussion as to whether
to grandfather in managers that no longer take money . . . [b]ut in the end a grandfathering
clause was not included in the rule.”).
240

Id. (“SEC Chairman Christopher Cox told a gathering in China that he was well aware
some hedge funds were skirting the registration requirement by closing their funds to new
investors.”).
241
Anuj Gangahar, SEC Rule Ignores Highest-risk Category of Fund Fraud, FIN. NEWS
ONLINE US, Oct. 31, 2005, http://www.financialnews-us.com/index.cfm?content id=537169.
242

Id.

243

Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, 69 Fed. Reg.
45,172, 45,198 (July 28, 2004) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 275, 279) (Glassman, Comm’r,
& Atkins, Comm’r, dissenting).
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half of the funds charged with committing fraud.244 In addition, the SEC is now
considering exempting from registration hedge funds with less than $50,000,000 in
assets245 due to their lack of resources.
B. SEC’s Inability to Conduct Random Audits
The Commission does not have the resources to conduct random examinations of
hedge funds.246 In fact, it barely has enough examiners to audit mutual funds.247
Moreover, the SEC’s budget was cut in 2006, and it is thus unlikely that the
Commission will be able to hire more inspectors.248 Even assuming that random
audits are an effective method to regulate hedge funds, because the solution is too
expensive, the SEC will not be able to successfully employ this practice.249
C. Ineffectiveness of Random Audits in Preventing Fraud
Random audits, in addition to being too expensive, are unlikely to effectively
detect fraud.250 This is primarily because such audits are done on a cyclical basis.251
A conservative estimate of how often the SEC will conduct these examinations is
once every five years, but the audits may be even more infrequent.252 While a
perfectly timed examination may expose fraud, these examinations are so isolated
that most fraudulent funds can successfully conceal their illegal activity.253 For
example, a hedge fund may be able to register with the Commission, conduct
business for up to five years, defraud investors, and close the fund before the SEC
ever conducts an audit.254 While these audits could be performed retrospectively, it

244

Id.

245

See Gangahar, supra note 241.

246

Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, 69 Fed. Reg.
72,054, 72,093 (Dec. 10, 2004) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 275, 279) (Glassman,
Comm’r, & Atkins, Comm’r, dissenting). (“The Commission lacks the resources necessary to
conduct frequent, comprehensive hedge fund adviser examinations, and our lack of resources
is a matter of public record.” (footnote omitted)).
247

See Swensen, supra note 44, at A21 (“The prospect of random audits likewise carries
little potential benefit; the already overburdened Commission can barely deal with its mutual
fund caseload.”).
248
Chidem Kurdas, Commissioner: Sound Industry Practices Offer Better Control than
SEC Registration, HEDGEWORLD DAILY NEWS, Sept. 30, 2005, at 1.
249

See Swensen, supra note 44, at A21.

250

Letter from W. Hardy Callcott, Partner, Bingham McCutchen LLP, to Commissioners
of the SEC, at 2 (Sept. 15, 2004), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s73004/
whcallcott091504.pdf.
251

Id. at 1-2.

252

Id. (“I think most investors would be very surprised to learn that the Commission staff
does not examine SEC-registered advisers even as often as twice a decade.”).
253

Id. at 2.

254

Id.
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is unlikely that the fund will even exist, and if it does it will probably not be able to
pay back investors.255
In addition to the problems posed by cyclical examinations, regulation of the
mutual fund industry shows that random audits alone do little to detect fraud.256
Moreover, hedge funds are more complex than mutual funds and are therefore more
difficult to audit.257 Because auditing hedge funds is complex and mutual fund audits
show that this method alone does not prevent fraud, solely conducting random audits
of hedge funds will not detect fraud.258
With respect to deterrence, the threat of examination will not discourage
individuals from committing fraud.259 Such a threat will not deter fraud because it is
public knowledge that the SEC lacks the resources to frequently conduct audits.260
Consequently, perpetrators will not be discouraged by only a slight increase in the
risk of being apprehended for their actions.
D. Failure of the Rule to Limit Hedge Funds’ Use of Leverage
The Amended Advisers Act does not address the problem that hedge funds’ use
of leverage poses to financial markets.261 Concededly, the Advisers Act is not the
appropriate regulation by which the SEC could limit hedge funds’ use of leverage.262
However, leverage restrictions could be imposed by subjecting hedge funds to
regulation under the Investment Company Act of 1940.263 Failing to address the
issue of leverage ignores the problem that started the government’s examination of

255

Id.

256

See Kurdas, supra note 248, at 1. Other measures taken in conjunction with random
audits have been effective in detecting and deterring mutual fund fraud. Id. However, these
measures are very expensive and even if they were employed, it is unlikely that they would
help detect hedge fund fraud because of the complexity of these investments. Id.
257

Id.

258

Id.

259

Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, 69 Fed. Reg.
72,054, 72,093 (Dec. 10, 2004) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 275, 279) (Glassman,
Comm’r, & Atkins, Comm’r, dissenting).
260

Id.

261

Id. at 72,055-59 (majority) (explaining that the only reasons for amending the
Investment Advisers Act are the growth of hedge funds, the growth of hedge fund fraud, and
the retailization of hedge funds, and thus acknowledging by negative implication that the
amendments do not address hedge funds’ use of leverage).
262

Id. at 72,058.
The principal concerns of the President's Working Group report were the stability of
financial markets and the exposure of banks and other financial institutions to the
counterparty risks of dealing with highly leveraged entities such as the LTCM hedge
fund. The focus of the Advisers Act is different, and includes such concerns as the
prevention of frauds on investors.
Id. at 72,058 n.43.
263

Id.
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this industry.264 Though the SEC chose not to address this problem at the time the
Amended Act was proposed, it should have adopted a comprehensive legislative
scheme regulating hedge funds. Consequently, when the SEC decided to amend the
Advisers Act to regulate hedge funds, it should have amended the Investment
Company Act to restrict hedge funds’ use of leverage.
E. Failure of the Rule to Limit Retailization of Funds of Funds
While the Amended Advisers Act increases the requirements for individuals to
invest in hedge funds and requires funds of funds to register with the Commission, it
does not restrict the sale of funds of funds to average investors.265 An individual who
has income of $200,000 a year and $25,000 to invest in the market may invest in a
fund of fund.266 Moreover, many individuals and married couples filing a joint return
can meet the net worth requirement of $1,000,000, but some of these individuals are
not experienced investors.267 Because average investors can invest in funds of funds
and such funds are increasing their marketing to such investors, the Amended
Advisers Act does not effectively limit the retailization of these funds.268
VII. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
There are three cost effective and highly efficient solutions to remedy the
problems created by hedge funds. Each proposed solution is specifically designed to
counteract the main problems269 caused by the hedge fund industry. First, to prevent
fraud, the SEC should require all hedge funds to register with the Commission, adopt
a risk-based approach for conducting audits, and impose guidelines for determining
which funds to audit. Second, to restrict average investors’ access to funds of funds,
the SEC should adopt the “qualified client” criteria for funds of funds and raise the
minimum investment requirements for both funds of funds and traditional hedge
funds. Third, to prevent the risk of market collapse, the SEC should restrict hedge
funds’ use of leverage by requiring that such use does not exceed a maximum
leverage ratio.
A. Preventing Fraud
To prevent fraud, the SEC should require all hedge fund advisers to register with
the Commission.270 Such registration would allow the SEC to examine hedge funds
with less than $30,000,000 worth of investments.271 Consequently, the Commission
264
See PRESIDENT’S WORKING GROUP, supra note 75, at 29 (“The LTCM episode well
illustrates the need for . . . hedge funds, to face constraints in the amount of leverage they can
assume.”).
265
See Zimmermann, supra note 40, at 1 (“[T]here are many unsophisticated investors who
have the financial means to qualify.”).
266

Id.

267

Id.

268

Id.

269

See supra text accompanying notes 83-138.

270

See Gangahar, supra note 241.

271

Id.
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would be empowered to monitor and audit hedge fund advisers who have been
charged with nearly half of the counts of hedge fund fraud.272
To prevent fraud, the SEC should also adopt a risk-based approach for
conducting audits. The reason the SEC must exempt from registration hedge fund
advisers with fewer assets is because their system of random audits contains
excessive administration costs. Instead of using this cyclical approach, the SEC
should adopt a risk-based system to determine which hedge funds pose the highest
risk of fraud.273 In fact, the Commission is trying to develop such a system for all
investment advisers, which will be specifically designed for the investment vehicle
offered by each registrant.274 Under this system, risk factors for fraud would be
developed for each investment vehicle.275 Then, when investment advisers exhibited
one or more of the risk factors, the SEC would be prompted to audit the fund.276
With respect to hedge funds, the SEC ought to conduct mini sweeps of hedge fund
advisers to determine what criteria to use in this risk-assessment model.277 Such a
system should be adopted because it allows the Commission to audit those funds that
create the highest risk of fraud while conserving resources on funds that are
complying with regulations.
Finally, to prevent fraud, the SEC should impose guidelines for assessing which
funds to audit. A fundamental part of the risk-based approach should result in the
Commission examining Form ADV to determine whether the hedge fund has listed a
legitimate auditor and broker-dealer and to ascertain whether the fund has any
affiliation with these firms.278 A legitimate auditor and broker-dealer would need to
be an established business with a proven track record rather than a start-up company.
272

Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, 69 Fed. Reg.
72,054, 72,096 (Dec. 10, 2004) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 275, 279) (Glassman,
Comm’r, & Atkins, Comm’r, dissenting).
273

Regulation of the Hedge Fund Industry: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking,
Hous. & Urban Affairs, 108th Cong. 13 (2004) (statement of William H. Donaldson,
Chairman, U.S. SEC), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname
=108_senate_hearings&docid=f:29308.pdf. Donaldson gave this testimony to support the
release, issued thirteen days later, which proposed amendments to the Investment Advisers
Act.
274

Id.
I have asked the staff to develop a phased approach to oversight and examination of
our investment adviser registrants, including hedge fund advisers. Toward that end, we
have formed a working group within the Commission which is comprised of senior
staff from different offices and divisions within the Commission to explore how the
Commission goes about overseeing investment adviser registrants in general and
specifically including hedge fund advisers.
Id.
275

Id.

276

Id.

277

Id. (“[O]ur examination staff could conduct mini-sweeps of hedge fund advisers to
garner critical information about hedge fund services.”).
278

Jenny Anderson, A Modest Proposal to Prevent Hedge Fund Fraud, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7,
2005, at C6.
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The effectiveness of basing inspections on this information is best exemplified by reexamining the fraud perpetrated by Bayou and Wood River.279
Wood River listed a former American Express unit as their outside auditor, but
that company did not audit the fund.280 Had the SEC used the legitimate auditor
criteria to assess the risk of fraud created by Wood River, the Commission would
have been prompted to audit the fund. With respect to Bayou, its auditor was a
fictitious accounting firm that was affiliated with the fund.281 If the SEC had used
the affiliated auditor criteria to inspect the fund, the discovery of this auditor would
have caused the Commission to examine Bayou. The results of these methods are
similar regarding the firms’ broker-dealers. Bayou’s broker-dealer, Bayou Securities,
was a dealer affiliated with the fund.282 Had the SEC employed a risk-based system
using the criteria of an affiliated broker, it would have been prompted to examine
Bayou. With respect to Wood River, the company claimed as a broker-dealer a firm
that never executed any of its trades.283 If the SEC used the legitimate broker-dealer
risk criteria, they would have conducted an examination of Wood River.
Wood River and Bayou illustrate that it is difficult for a hedge fund adviser to
commit fraud when it has legitimate and nonaffiliated auditors and broker-dealers.284
By implementing a risk-based system, it is likely that audits of advisers can be
conducted annually or bi-annually at the same cost as the current system of cyclical
examinations. The result will be the auditing of the highest-risk advisers more
frequently285 at the same cost.
B. Restrict Average Investors Access to Funds of Funds
To restrict average investors’ access to funds of funds, the SEC should adopt the
“qualified client” criteria for funds of funds. The SEC should require that investors
in funds of funds be “qualified clients” rather than “accredited investors.” The
“accredited investor” standard286 allows average investors to invest in funds of funds.
On the other hand, the “qualified investor” standard strikes the appropriate balance
between preventing average investors from investing in hedge funds and allowing
sophisticated individuals to make such investments. Moreover, the SEC has already
considered the “qualified investor” definition to be the correct standard for
traditional hedge funds.287 Using the same standard will simplify the regulation of
this industry. Such uniformity will also reduce the confusing and conflicting nature
of these requirements for investors because they do have quite different standards.
Additionally, this standard is proper because funds of funds indirectly charge profit
279

Id.

280

Hibbard & Carter, supra note 88, at 38.

281

Id.

282

Id.

283

Id.

284

Anderson, supra note 278, at C6.

285

See generally supra note 274.

286

See supra note 36.

287

See supra text accompanying notes 190-202.
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participation fees and the “qualified investor” standard was specially designed for
funds that charge such fees.288
Other alternatives for increasing the requirements to invest in funds of funds are
inappropriate because they interfere with the regulation of other investment vehicles.
For example, changing the definition of an “accredited investor” to the definition of
a “qualified investor” is not appropriate because it interferes with the use of this
standard by private equity funds. Similarly, changing the definition of an “accredited
investor” to that of a “qualified purchaser” would have similar adverse effects.
Because mandating that an investor be a “qualified client” to invest in funds of funds
increases the requirements to a sufficient amount but does not cause interference
with other investments, it is the correct standard.
To restrict average investors’ access to funds of funds, the SEC should also raise
the minimum investment requirements for both funds of funds and traditional hedge
funds. In addition to requiring that individuals satisfy the definition of a “qualified
client” to invest in funds of funds, the SEC should mandate that all hedge funds and
funds of funds have a minimum investment requirement of $250,000. While most
hedge funds impose such a requirement, some hedge funds have decreased their
requirements over time.289 Moreover, funds of funds already have investment
minimums as low as $25,000.290 Requiring a $250,000 minimum accompanied by
the “qualified client” definition creates uniformity for hedge funds and funds of
funds. This standard assures that average investors are restricted from investing in
traditional hedge funds and funds of funds.
C. Limiting the Risk of Market Collapse
To prevent the risk of market collapse, the SEC should restrict hedge funds’ use
of leverage. While traditional hedge funds and funds of funds pose unique problems
to average investors, the possibility of hedge funds causing a market crisis affects the
entire financial system. Because hedge funds are exempt from the Investment
Company Act, they use large amounts of leverage to engage in risky investments.291
A market shift against one large fund using leverage or against small funds that use
leverage and have the same investment positions could cause these funds to default
on their loans.292 When many debtors cannot pay creditors at the same time, it can
cause the financial system to collapse.293
To stop this excessive use of borrowed money, the SEC should restrict hedge
funds’ use of leverage.294 The way to accomplish this goal is for the Commission to
288
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employ the same method used for mutual funds, which is the requirement of a
maximum leverage ratio.295 Like mutual funds, hedge funds have a large amount of
assets invested in the markets.296 However, hedge fund investments cause a greater
risk of market collapse than do mutual funds due to their use of leverage and lack of
diversification.297 Because hedge funds are formidable in size and threaten the
financial system, the SEC should limit hedge funds’ use of leverage by using a
maximum leverage ratio. 298
An effective rate for the maximum leverage ratio would be the rate used for
mutual funds. Under such regulation, hedge funds’ use of debt would be limited to
one-third of its investments.299 For example, a hedge fund with $3,000,000 in assets
could only borrow $1,000,000 to make investments. To enact this requirement, the
SEC should amend the Investment Company Act of 1940 to require that any fund
exempted from registration as an “investment company” by either section 3(c)(1) or
3(c)(7) of the Act, be subject to the leverage restrictions imposed by section 18 of the
Act.300
Employing a maximum leverage ratio would limit the amount of systemic risk
created by hedge funds. Systemic risk would be reduced because a hedge fund
suffering large losses would have sufficient assets to pay off its debts. Therefore, if
the market caused one large hedge fund or several small funds with similar positions
to lose large amounts of money, the fund or funds could still pay their creditors.
Because funds would be able to pay their creditors, these funds would not default on
their loans. The problem of systemic risk would be eliminated and a situation
analogous to the collapse of Long-Term Capital Management would be unlikely to
occur.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Hedge funds are a viable investment alternative for financially sophisticated
investors. However, because traditional hedge funds and funds of funds are
unsuitable for average investors, these investors should be restricted from making
such investments. Regardless of who invests in hedge funds, advisers of these
entities must be regulated to assure that they do not commit fraud. In addition to
monitoring advisers, the SEC must limit hedge funds’ use of leverage to assure that
market collapse does not occur.
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While the amendments to the Investment Advisers Act addressed some of the
problems created by hedge funds, it is insufficient to regulate these entities. More
SEC action is needed to adequately protect investors from the problems created by
hedge funds. While some of these actions were suggested in this Note, more
measures are necessary to effectively regulate this growing industry.
IX. ADDENDUM
In Goldstein v. SEC,301 the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia vacated
the amendments to the Investment Advisers Act holding that the rule was
“arbitrary.”302 The hedge fund challenging the law successfully argued that the SEC
misinterpreted section 203(b)(3) of the Advisers Act when it redefined the word
“client” to include shareholders, limited partners, members, or beneficiaries of a
“private fund.”303 The court reasoned that both Congress and the SEC had
historically and recently concluded that individuals such as limited partners or
shareholders are not “clients” for purposes of the Advisers Act.304 It further pointed
out that it was “arbitrary” for funds with one hundred or fewer investors to be
exempt from the more demanding Investment Company Act, while those with fifteen
or more investors were subject to the Advisers Act.305 Consequently, the court
vacated and remanded the Amended Investment Advisers Act.306
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